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Jean-Luc  Marion’s  writings  range  from  revolutionary 
approaches  on  Descartes  oeuvres,  to  apologetic  debates  in 
theology  and  groundbreaking  inquiries  into  the  realm  of 
phenomenology. When dealing with such a vast amount of topics 
the  reader  finds  himself  rather  puzzled  concerning  the 
cohesiveness of Marion’s entire corpus, and the question of how 
one  should  engage  such  a  variety  of  subjects.  While  the 
originality of his work on Descartes seems to be a common place 
among  scholars,  the  problem  rests  with  the  relation  between 
phenomenology and theology. Here, the readings waver from a 
theological or hermeneutical or “non-egological” understanding, 
to claims that he is not theological or hermeneutical enough, or 
that the ego still plays an important role in his work1. Despite all 
these conflicting narratives, there are scholars2 that have a more 
holistic understanding of Marion’s enterprise. 
In his recent book A Genealogy of Marion’s Philosophy of 
Religion: apparent Darkness, Tamsin Jones takes up the holistic 
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basic  tension,  namely  that  between  the  demands  of 
methodological rigor and  the anti-idolatrous claim (4). Drawing 
on  two  Greek  patristic  sources  in  Marion  –  Dionysius  the 
Areopagite  and  Gregory  of  Nyssa  –  he  unravels  the  entire 
schema of this tension and, in the end, points a way to balance it. 
The first task of the book (chapter I) is to reveal the place, 
the reason and the purpose of the many citings of Dionysius and 
Gregory throughout Marion’s work. This whole itinerary leads 
Jones from analyses of Marion’s first articles, through some of 
the most famous books (The Idol and Distance and God Without 
Being) ending with his last publication Au lieu de soi: L’approche 
de Saint Augustin. Besides providing arguments in favor of the 
holistic  view  –  since  givenness  or  the  conceptual  dyad  visible-
invisible are major themes that can be trace back to Marion’s fist 
writings  (pp.15-17)  –  the  analyses  also  reveal  two  important 
aspects of the way the citings of the Gregory and Dionysius work. 
First of all, the quotations function as a source of authority in 
contemporary  apologetic  debates  –  and  also  in  more 
philosophical  accounts  –  especially  because  of  the  manner  in 
which  the  Fathers  appropriate  certain  theological  problems: 
instead of starting from a rational point of view and advancing 
different hypotheses, they wait to “receive properly what is to be 
received  from  God”  (18).  Secondly,  Marion  recovers  these  two 
authors in a univocal manner that frequently takes the form of 
employing Gregory’s ideas as proofs for Dionysius. This pattern 
of citings is exposed exemplarily by Jones’ analyses of Marion’s 
In the Name: How to avoid speaking of it. Here Marion engages 
himself  in  a  debate  with  Derrida  who  claims  that  negative 
(apophatic) theology cannot avoid metaphysics and consequently, 
is  subjected  to  deconstruction  (32).  Marion  responds  to  this 
critique with the idea of a third way of speaking in Dionysius. He 
draws  on  his  translation  of  the  term  αỉτία  as  the  Requisite 
instead of cause, claiming that for Dionysius this term has no 
intention  of  naming  God,  that  is,  has  no  connection  with  the 
Aristotelian  predicative  language.  Instead,  αỉτία  denominates, 
pointing  to  a  somewhat  non-predicative  language:  therefore 
language praises God as αỉτία in the act of praying. Here, Marion 
faces in a very precise way the Derridean critique, since prayer 
praises God as something and therefore by naming. To avoid it, BOOK REVIEWS 
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he  brings  in  Gregory’s  theory  of  language  from  Contra 
Eunomium,  which  claims  that  language  does  not  name  the 
essence  of  things  but  only  fulfills  the  pragmatic  function  of 
indication,  without  manifesting  something  (36).  This  shows 
precisely how Marion mixes up the two authors in a univocal 
retrieval that governs explicitly or implicitly his entire work. The 
only problem with this pattern is raised by Jones’ analyses of 
Marion’s last published book Au lieu de soi: L’approche de Saint 
Augustin.  It  is  obvious  that  this  last  publication  is  a  turning 
point for Marion, shifting from the Greek Fathers to a peculiar 
Latin one, from apophasis to confession and from invisibility to 
beatific vision (42). Nevertheless it continues a movement which 
began  with  The  Erotic  Phenomenon  and  analyzes  the  moral 
implications  of  the  passive  self  in  relation  with  unlimited 
givenness.  From  this  perspective,  the  pattern  that  Jones 
unravels is confirmed again. 
Having  that  figured  out,  Jones  proceeds  further  in  the 
analyses  of  the  legitimacy  of  such  a  univocal  retrieval  of  the 
Christian authors in Marion’s corpus. Although Marion employs 
the  Fathers  in  constructing  his  anti-idolatrous  (apophatic) 
strategy – that is, a discourse proper to God – he ignores that 
their  approaches  on  the  topic  comes  with  a  bigger  frame  of 
reference,  one  that  involves  also  cosmological,  theological  and 
anthropological  presuppositions  due  to  which,  instead  of  one 
apophatic strategy, Marion ends up with two different projects.  
First,  for  Gregory,  language  has  its  place  in  a  world 
determined by two components: diastema and kinesis (57). While 
the former describes the absolute gap between God and creation, 
the later constitute all beings in an ongoing movement toward an 
infinite  creator.  Hence,  despite  the  fact  that  language  is 
conventional,  thus  reflecting  the  human  speaker,  it  is  in  the 
same  manner  reliable  and  humble  due  to  the  fact  that  it 
constitutes  a  response  to  God’s  revelation,  regardless  of  the 
imperfections that comes with this response.  
Second, from Dionysius’ perspective, language is a system 
of symbols that points toward a divine creator. Since creation is 
understood as a hierarchical givenness out of divine love (58-72), 
this  pointing  is  twofold:  on  the  one  hand,  it  sets  up  in  a 
“projection” that opens the possibility for an ontological and an META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 
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epistemological connection between creation and creator; one the 
other  hand,  it  always needs  to  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  sign 
never  reaches  its  ground  since  the  latter  is  beyond  every 
signification.  Thus,  Jones  concludes  that  in  the  Dionysian 
understanding  of  language  there  is  a  perpetual  play  between 
disclosure and concealment that materializes on the one hand in 
an infinite number of names, on the other hand in an ascent into 
silence that opens up a hymnic worship.  
Consequently, since Dionysius’ apophaticism is concerned 
with  assigning  human  beings  their  right  place  according  with 
God,  while  Gregorys’  deals  with  a  never  ending  movement 
toward  the  divine,  Jones  finds  their  univocal  retrieval 
inadmissible. Since he stated in the beginning that this pattern 
of citing implicitly influences Marion’s philosophical works, the 
next two chapters represent an extensive analysis to disentangle 
which of the two anti-idolatrous strategies fits better with his 
phenomenology of givenness.  
In analyzing Marion’s phenomenology, Jones finds that it 
is  driven  by  two  central  motivations:  the  claim  to  free 
phenomena from all conditions and idolatrous restrains, and the 
urge to show the possibility of all phenomena (79). This means 
paradoxically,  that  his  method  requires  a  universal  (certain, 
indubitable and unquestionable) determination without deciding 
a  priori  any  specific  epistemological  corollary  (metaphysical 
specificity). The reduction to givenness seems to fulfill these two 
exigencies since, on the one hand it secures the indubitability of 
apparition of things without the certainty of objects, and on the 
other hand it renders itself as a counter-method (without giving 
up  its  hegemony  toward  other  sciences)  inasmuch  as  it 
intervenes  after  the  fact,  that  is,  after  the  manifestation  of 
appearing.  The  method  remains  phenomenological  since  it 
confines to the necessity of the describability of phenomena, and 
it approaches revelation only as a pure possibility (94). According 
to  Jones,  this  search  for  universality,  despite  Janicaud’s 
observation,  places  Marion  in  the  same  line  with  Husserl. 
Nevertheless, since the method intervenes only “after the fact”, I 
wonder how could one describe a pure possibility without any 
link to the actual happening, and thus, how could the neutrality 
of phenomenology remain untouched? BOOK REVIEWS 
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Furthermore,  Jones  argues  that  the  framework  of 
givenness  leads  back  to  Marion’s  recovery  of  Dionysius.  Thus, 
while  providing  him  with  an  apophatic  strategy  which  entails 
the  notion  of  givenness  Marion’s  recovery  of  Dionysius  also 
accomplishes  a  hierarchical  understanding  of  the  world  which 
means an ontological and epistemological leveling of things. This 
leads Jones to a double conclusion: first, Marion’s motivations – 
especially  the  claim  for  a  universal  method  –  leads  him  to 
refashion some of Dionysius’ ideas and concepts – like the term 
αỉτία (100) – to fit his intention, and second, when criticized3 for 
the  strange  imports  that  come  along  with  this  apophatic 
strategy, he resumes to Gregory without a specific note. 
 Since Dionysius’ apophasis does not provide a way out 
given  the  claim  for  a  universal  methodology,  Jones  turns  to 
Marions’ relation to Gregory, emphasizing the second pole of the 
tension: anti-idolatry. This second pole requires to loosen up the 
methodological  component  in  order  to  allow  a  place  for  more 
hermeneutical inquiry, especially when it comes to the saturated 
phenomena. The problem can be put like this: if pure givenness 
and saturation require a more passive subject which lacks any 
transcendental  function,  how  can  one  reinstate  hermeneutics 
without betraying the givenness or the saturation of phenomena? 
This breaks down into two additional challenges: a) the problem 
of the description of the excess and b) the difficulty of religious 
exclusivity  when  encountering  revelation  (111-119).  Following 
the thread of the first difficulty along Marion’s work, Jones finds 
that saturation necessitates rather than forbids interpretation, 
but the latter is somewhat a more subsequent act. Jones turns 
here  to  a  distinction  made  by  Shane  Mackinlay  between  the 
ontological  and  derivative  sense  of  hermeneutics:  while  the 
former is ruled out by the absoluteness of the given, the later 
still remains an open possibility. As far as the second difficulty, 
it is obvious that Marion favors the Christian examples when it 
comes to describing revelation, but he claims that the later is 
safeguarded  against  exclusivity  through  the  multitude  of 
hermeneutical  possibilities  that  are  requested  by  its  excess. 
Nevertheless  the  problem  stands  since  in  both  cases  Marion 
never  elaborates  the  relation  between  the  purity  of  givenness 
and the multiplicity of hermeneutical possibilities.  META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 
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Jones returns now to Gregory in an attempt to see if his 
apophatic  strategy  could  point  a  way  to  resolve  Marion’s 
problematic. Gregory states that the relation between scriptural 
interpretation  and  divine  incomprehensibility  results  in  a 
necessary  interpretative  pluralism  (129).  Since  language  has 
only  a  pragmatic  function,  it      is  due  to  God’s  kenosis  that 
humans have access to revelation, but this happens by filling and 
overwhelming our finite capacity to understand and interpret it. 
In this act of interpretation the subject is not only disrupted, but 
also  transformed  to  be  able  to  receive  more,  and  more,  in  an 
infinite  movement  towards  God.  Jones  claims  that  this  could 
serve  as  better  example  in  pointing  out  a  way  for  Marion’s 
aporia.  
In  his  last  chapter,  Jones  proceeds  to  an  appraisal  of 
Marion’s  apophatic  phenomenology.  In  his  genealogical 
movement to uncover the tension between methodology and the 
anti-idolatrous pretence he has linked the former with Marion’s 
use  of Dionysius,  and  the  latter  with  analyses  on  Gregory.  In 
order to obtain coherence, Jones claims that the methodological 
pole is the least sustainable out of the two, since the reduction 
excludes  any  productive  or  volitional  role  of  the  subject  (132). 
Not even through the recourse to love does Marion’s reduction 
become any more clear: while insisting on the universality of love 
its appearance can only be personal and thus “subjective”. Jones 
thinks that the abandonment of the claim for universality would 
yield to a softer understanding of the method, along the lines of 
Pierre Hadot’s spiritual exercises. This would allow Marion to 
maintain  the  purity  of  givenness  along  with  the  plurality  of 
interpretation (135). However, I believe that this might lead to 
the revoking of the reduction’s phenomenological status. It is my 
content that a more accurate elaboration of the reduction, so that 
a  clear  distinction  can  be  drawn  between  lack  and  excess  of 
intuition, might lead to a clarification of the role of hermeneutics. 
I believe that this conceptual indistinctness (lack/excess) posits 
so much weight on hermeneutics leading the entire problem to 
an unsolvable aporia.  
Turning on the second pole of the tension, Jones claims 
that in the development of the relation between pure givenness 
and  the  role  of  hermeneutics  a  more  obvious  and  careful BOOK REVIEWS 
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consideration of Gregory could prove useful for Marion’s entire 
project.  With  his  understanding  of  language  as  a  pragmatic 
discourse and the assigning of the limits of knowledge, Gregory 
outruns Dionysius whose recovery tends to unbalance the entire 
tension from Marion’s thought.  
Although  I  wonder  whether  such  a  specific  import  of 
Gregory  would  resolve  the  tension  from  Marion’s  work,  Jones’ 
book remains one of the most challenging exegeses. The clarity 
and force of the arguments, as well as the novelty of the analyses 
opens new and interesting ways to approach Marion’s work. 
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